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Nuclear Dimensions of  the Iraqi Crisis 1
In accordance with Resolution 1441,2 unanimously passed by the UN Secu-
rity Council, Iraq on November 7th, 2002, submitted a declaration of its activi-
ties concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD).3 Copies of the
declaration were forwarded to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and later to the permanent members of the Security Council. The declaration
described the various methods used by Iraq in trying to produce nuclear ma-
terial suitable for weapons, as well as the many sites involved in the nuclear
program.4 In the nearly 12,000-page document Iraq claimed that it had no
current WMD programs. However, intelligence analysts from the United States
and other nations immediately began to scrutinize the document, and senior
US officials quickly rejected the claims made by Iraq.5
January 27, 2003, the UN inspectors currently working inside Iraq report-
ed back to the Security Council about their preliminary findings. UN weapons
inspection chief Hans Blix then said Iraq had not genuinely accepted the UN
resolution demanding that it disarm.6 During the same brief, Mohamed ElBa-
radei, Director-General of the IAEA, said his inspectors had found no prohib-
ited nuclear activity at new sites visited in Iraq, but that his teams needed an
additional «few months» to complete the search. He added that the infrastruc-
ture for effective inspections was now in place. However, US ambassador to
the United Nations John Negroponte immediately reacted to the report by
claiming that Iraq was failing to comply with UN disarmament demands.7
If Iraq fails to disclose its weapons of mass destruction program and dis-
arm fully, the United States stands ready to lead a coalition to disarm Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein through military force – even alone if its divided
European allies would not join the fight.8 Only weeks after it had been sub-
mitted, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said the Iraqi declaration was in
«material breach» of UN Security Council resolutions and that it totally «fails
to move us in the direction of a peaceful solution.»9 February 5, 2003, Powell
1 Henrik Thune and Brikt Harr Vaage contributed inputs and comments during the preparation
of this research note. Paul Rogers provided useful background information. Any mistakes or
inaccuracies, however, are of course the full responsibility of the author.
2 The text can be found at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/11/08/resolution.text/index.html
3 The Iraqi dossier included more than 11,800 pages and 12 CD-ROMs containing 529 mega-
bytes of information.
4 According to the table of contents of the dossier, 443 pages are devoted to the Iraqi nuclear
program; see  http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd16.pdf .
5 Jeffrey Richelson, «Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction», National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book  no. 80,  December 20, 2002, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB80/
6 Statement by Hans Blix to the UN Security Council, January 27, 2003.
7 CNN, «U.S. urges U.N. to get tougher on Iraq», January 27, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/
US/01/27/sprj.irq.wrap/index.html
8 Mark Landler and Alan Cowell, «Powell, in Europe, Nearly Dismisses U.N.’s Iraq report»,
New York Times, January 23, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/international/
middleeast/27IRAQ.html?todaysheadlines
9 CNN, «Powell Lays Out Path in Iraq Dispute», December 19, 2002, http://www.cnn.com/
2002/US/12/19/sproject.irq.us.iraq.war/index.html
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used images, audiotapes and anecdotal points during his presentation to the
UN Security Council to describe what he said is Iraq’s deception of the UN
weapons inspection program.
This situation opens up for an array of scenarios, some of which could
involve the use of nuclear weapons. Through a set of questions and answers,
this research note will assess the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used in
the conjunction with the Iraqi crisis. The conclusion is that, although the risk
for now is limited, it is still not negligible. If anything, the most immediate nu-
clear threat emanates not from Saddam Hussein’s own nuclear capabilities,
but in fact from US – and possibly British – forces in a response to Iraqi bio-
logical or chemical weapons.
Does Iraq possess nuclear weapons?
After UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency were forced
to leave Iraq in 1998, confusion has remained within the international commu-
nity about the country’s nuclear capabilities. Former key Iraqi nuclear scien-
tists now in exile portray the Iraqi nuclear program as well advanced,10 although
questions have been raised about their credibility and possible hidden agen-
das.11 Reportedly, IAEA officials – and even US intelligence experts – pri-
vately put scant faith in the claims of various Iraqi defectors that Iraq retains
the ability to make fissile material, has extensive covert fissile material pro-
duction facilities, and has workable bomb designs small enough to be used in
missile warheads.12
According to ElBaradei in December 1998, when the inspections came to
an abrupt halt, the IAEA had neutralized the Iraqi nuclear program.13 Dam-
age from Operation Desert Storm had virtually incapacitated the country’s
nuclear weapons infrastructure, but UNSCOM and IAEA proved even more
effective in destroying Iraq’s nuclear program than the coalition bombers.14
At that time the agency was thus confident it had not missed any significant
component of Iraq’s nuclear program. On November 27, 2002, the IAEA was
10 Khidhir Hamza is the source of many headlines claiming that Iraq is on the verge of (or
already has) nuclear weapon capability. He has been portrayed as a key Iraqi bombmaker. See
e.g. Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam’s Bombmaker: The Daring Escape of the Man
Who Built Iraq’s Secret Weapon, Touchstone, October 2001.
11 See e.g. Norman Dombey, «What Has He Got?», The London Review of Books, October 17,
2002, p. 27.
12 Anthony H. Cordesman, «Iraqi War Fighting Capabilities: A Dynamic Net Assessment»,
Testimony to the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, July 31, 2002, p. 10, http://
www.csis.org/hill/ts020731cord.pdf
13 Remarks by Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, International Atomic Energy Agency, at
the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington D.C., November 14-
15, 2002, http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/conference/speeches/Elbaradei.pdf .
14 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1999, p. 647.
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able to resume its inspection activities.15 As of the end of January 2003, the
IAEA has found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear program since
the elimination of the program in the 1990s.16
In any case, Iraq’s nuclear ambitions remain unquestionable and probably
quite comprehensive. What stands between Saddam Hussein and nuclear
capabilities are rather technical capacities and competence than lack of mo-
tivation. Past inspections have revealed clandestine uranium enrichment pro-
grams and «repeated and willful non-compliance with past Security Council
Resolutions (SCR 687 and 707) and violation of UN/IAEA privileges and
immunities».17 After the last round of inspections, remaining questions and
concerns regarding Iraq’s nuclear program relate to:18 uncertainty about the
progress made in weapons design and centrifuge development due to the lack
of relevant documentation; the extent of external assistance from which Iraq
had benefited; and the lack of evidence that Iraq had abandoned definitively
its nuclear program.
Key questions for consideration now are thus:
• if and to what extent Iraq has been able to reinstall pre-1991 nuclear ca-
pacities (i.e. from the time before the inspections started),
• the potentials for a nuclear crash-program,
• whether Iraq managed to hide vital parts of its nuclear weapon program
from the inspections in the 1990s,
• Additionally, the prospects for Iraq developing and deploying so-called ra-
diological dispersal devices are a special case that needs to be considered.
15 For an assessment and a summary of the inspection activities since then, see David Cortright,
Alistair Millar, George A. Lopez, and Linda Gerber, «UN Weapon Inspections in Iraq: A
Progress Report, published by the Forth Freedom Forum and Joan B. Koch Institute for
International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, January 23, 2003, p. 10,  David
Cortright, Alistair Millar, George A. Lopez, and Linda Gerber, «UN Weapon Inspections in
Iraq: A Progress Report, published by the Forth Freedom Forum and Joan B. Koch Institute
for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, January 23, 2003,
www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/inspections_report.pdf
16 Statement given by IAEA Director ElBaradei to the UN Security Council, January 27, 2003.
17 From a letter dated 6 October 1997 from the Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency to the Secretary General. The complete document, with attachments, is
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd06.pdf  Part one of the
report attached to the letter describes the work done by the IAEA during the period April 1
to October 1, 1997, in monitoring and verifying Iraqi compliance with the nuclear disarma-
ment provisions of UN Resolution 687 (1991). It includes an extensive summary of the
technical discussions between IAEA and Iraq. The second part of the report provides an
overview of IAEA activities since 1991 related to on-site inspection of Iraqi’s nuclear
capabilities and the destruction, removal, or neutralization of Iraqi nuclear weapons or
nuclear weapons related material or facilities.
18 IAEA, «Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002)»,
January 27, 2003, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/
unscreport_290103.html
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Question: Could the nuclear capacities of Iraq possibly have been
reinstalled?
Since the end of the 1990s, Saddam Hussein has tried covertly to acquire
technology and materials that could be used in the production of nuclear ma-
terial; moreover, he is reported to have recalled scientists to work on Iraq’s
nuclear weapon program.19 Allegedly, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly met
with his nuclear scientists over the past two years, signaling his continued
interest in developing the nuclear program.20 This does not, however, mean
he has succeeded. The potential for Iraq’s reinstalling its nuclear weapon
Figure 1. The Iraqi bomb design, with supplying countries. From Iraq Watch,
http://www.iraqwatch.org/wmd/index.htmlwww.iraqwatch.org/wmd/nuclear.html
19 Based on «Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction», The Assessment of the British Government,
Stationary Office, September 24, 2002, p. 19, http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/iraq/wmd.pdf
20 U.S. State Department, A Decade of Deception and Defiance, September 12, 2002, p.10,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd10.pdf
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capacity can best be understood by looking at the state and magnitude of the
country’s earlier nuclear weapon ambitions, and at challenges to its produc-
tion of nuclear weapons in the past.21
Iraq has been pursuing an implosion weapon (see figure 1, page 8). This is
a first- generation nuclear weapon design, used in 1945 in Nagasaki. Howev-
er, while the USA then used plutonium, the Iraqi design is based on highly
enriched uranium (HEU). The design is fairly crude, but more complicated
and less reliable than gun-type weapons. Space constraints, where a gun-type
weapon easily becomes too large to fit into a missile, led Iraq to focus on the
more advanced implosion design. Moreover, the Israeli bombing of the Osiraq
research reactor in 1981 represented a severe blow to the plutonium path, and
may very well have contributed to Iraq’s decision to focus on HEU.
The fission weapon consists of HEU for the weapon core, explosives to
compress the core rapidly, and sophisticated electronics to fire the explosives
simultaneously.22 The reflector returns neutrons that otherwise would have
escaped back to the core, and the tamper suppresses the expansion of the
system after the chain reaction has been initiated. Iraq has also admitted to
studying several approaches to building a neutron initiator, which is what sup-
plies the neutrons necessary to set off a nuclear chain reaction. To boost
weapons efficiency, Iraq produced and recovered tritium by irradiating lithi-
um, and produced and recovered polonium by irradiating bismuth.23
On paper, Iraq may thus have a workable nuclear design.24 In practice,
however, things probably look different. Prior to the Gulf War the Iraqis had
successfully overcome some, but certainly not all, of the obstacles to a work-
able device. Iraq still had significant hurdles to overcome before being able to
complete the fabrication of a first nuclear implosion device.25 Despite having
made progress in the high-explosive testing program, the Iraqi scientists were
struggling to master conventional charges that must be precisely fabricated in
order to produce simultaneous and homogenous shock-waves towards the core
after ignition. 26 Using HEU, a completed weapon based on the latest Iraqi
design might, moreover, have weighed about one ton – clearly a device that it
would have been hard to deliver with a missile.27
21 For a comprehensive summary of Iraqi nuclear ambitions and program see. Chapter 19 in
Anthony Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1999.
22 Based on «Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction», The Assessment of the British Government,
Stationary Office, September 24, 2002, p. 24, http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/iraq/wmd.pdf
2 3 The Iraq Watch,  http://www.iraqwatch.org/wmd/nuclear.html
24 Joseph Cirincione, John Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals. Tracking Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2002, p. 271.
25 IAEA, «Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002)»,
January 27, 2003, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/
unscreport_290103.html
26 Ibid., p. 275.
27 The Federation of American Scientists, «Iraqi Nuclear Weapons», http://www.fas.org/nuke/
guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm
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However, the major challenge facing Iraq in its pursuit of nuclear weap-
ons is to acquire fissile material in sufficient qualities and quantities. Fissile
material is the essential component of any nuclear device. Fundamental to
nuclear weapon production is thus the plutonium separation of spent fuel or
enrichment of uranium. These are substantial steps, and the primary reason
why nuclear weapons are hard to produce – for Iraq and for any other actors.
Iraq’s design called for 93% enriched uranium, which required multiple
stages of enrichment. Iraq had extensive programs to produce weapons-usa-
ble material along a range of different, and virtually all available, paths.28 Ef-
forts included Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS), centrifuges,
Laser Isotopic Separation (LIS), chemical and ion-exchange separation,
gaseous diffusion, and diversion of reactor fuel and plutonium separa-
tion.29 None of these efforts seem to have been sufficiently successful to
produce fissionable materials for a workable nuclear device.
Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS)
EMIS enrichment technology was abandoned by the United States in the
1950s because of its high consumption of electricity, but was adopted by the
Iraqis because of its relative simplicity and their ability to procure the magnet
material without encountering technology transfer obstacles.30 For a long while,
the EMIS program went undetected as it did not relay on state-of-the-art,
imported equipment that could have revealed the efforts. According to the
IAEA, however, calutron designs fell far short of meeting specifications.31
Expert estimates of Iraq’s ability to enrich uranium with the calutrons were
greatly reduced, from an initial high of 40 kilograms of highly enriched ura-
nium down to only milligrams.32
Centrifuges
Iraq started its gas-centrifuge for uranium enrichment later than its EMIS
program.33
Both gaseous diffusion and EMIS require enormous amounts of electricity,
28 An overview of Iraqi nuclear sites can be found at http://www.ceip.org/files/Iraq/index.htm
29 Plutonium may as well be applied in implosion designs, and this may explain why Iraq has
diverged from the uranium path. The use of plutonium, however, introduces even higher
construction challenges.
30 The Federation of American Scientists, «Uranium Production»,  http://www.fas.org/nuke/
intro/nuke/uranium.htm
31 Anthony H. Cordesman, «Iraqi War Fighting Capabilities: A Dynamic Net Assessment»,
Testimony to the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, July 31, 2002, p. 10, http://
www.csis.org/hill/ts020731cord.pdf
32 David Albright and Mark Hibbs, «Iraq: News the Front Page Missed», The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, Vol. 47, no. 8, October 1991, http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1991/o91/
o91reports.html
33 Centrifuge separation works by passing uranium molecules in gaseous form (UF6) through
Nuclear Dimensions of the Iraqi Crisis
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and Iraq’s centrifuge designs proved far less efficient during laboratory
review than initially estimated.34 As with other enrichment techniques, centri-
fuges require several repetitions with the enriched product to reach a concen-
tration high enough to serve as weapons-grade material.
For the centrifuge program, Iraq relied heavily on foreign contractors who
were willing to circumvent export controls and to sell classified design infor-
mation and technology and equipment parts on early Western-type centrifug-
es.35 The willingness to seize such business opportunities has now probably
been drastically reduced, not least due to the revelations of key international
suppliers in Iraq’s dossier provided to the Security Council. Concerns raised
by US and British officials about Iraqi attempts to acquire high-strength alu-
minum tubes for uranium enrichment using gas centrifuges were refuted by
the IAEA. According to IAEA Director ElBaradei, the tubes are not directly
suitable for the manufacture of uranium centrifuges.36 The claims where,
however, maintained US Secretary of State Colin Powell during his February
7, 2003 presentation to the UN Security Council. The case is now being fur-
ther investigated.37
Laser Isotopic Separation
In May 1994 the IAEA received information indicating that Iraq had pursued
laser uranium enrichment through both molecular and atomic vapor isotope
separation. But the IAEA did not believe that Iraq had made substantial
progress in either.38 Iraq later admitted to having had an exploratory laser
high-speed rotational machines called centrifuges. The different weights of the uranium
isotopes cause them to separate, with the heavier U-238 being thrown to the outside of the
centrifuge and the lighter U-235 staying nearer the inside. From The Iraq Watch,  http://
www.iraqwatch.org/wmd/nuclear.html
34 Anthony H. Cordesman, «Iraqi War Fighting Capabilities: A Dynamic Net Assessment»,
Testimony to the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, July 31, 2002, p. 10, http://
www.csis.org/hill/ts020731cord.pdf
35 Joseph Cirincione, John Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals. Tracking Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 2002,
p. 274.
36 David Cortright, Alistair Millar, George A. Lopez, and Linda Gerber, «UN Weapon Inspections
in Iraq: A Progress Report, published by the Forth Freedom Forum and Joan B. Koch Institute
for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, January 23, 2003, p. 10,
David Cortright, Alistair Millar, George A. Lopez, and Linda Gerber, «UN Weapon Inspections
in Iraq: A Progress Report, published by the Fourth Freedom Forum and the Joan B. Koch
Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, January 23, 2003,
p. 10, www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/inspections_report.pdf
37 Statement given by IAEA Director ElBaradei to the UN Security Council, January 27, 2003.
38 Because isotopes of different masses absorb different wavelengths of light, uranium isotopes
can be separated by lasers precisely tuned to excite or ionize only the U-235 atoms in a
stream of atomic vapor (atomic vapor laser isotope separation, or AVLIS). The U-235 is
then separated out using a chemical reaction or magnetic forces that attract the excited
atoms and leave behind the neutral ones. From the Iraq Watch, http://www.iraqwatch.org/
wmd/index.html
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program, a program that had continued up to 1987 without success. On Janu-
ary 16, 2003, UN weapons inspectors discovered at the Baghdad home of
nuclear physicist Faleh Hassan some 2,000 pages of documents related to
uranium enrichment through laser technology. However, although atomic and
molecular laser isotope separation appears promising, the technology has proven
extremely difficult to master and may be beyond the reach of even techni-
cally advanced states. A preliminary analysis of the documents suggests that
they are not of particular significance in terms of providing new information
concerning Iraq’s past nuclear program.39
Chemical and Ion-Exchange Separation
On a laboratory scale, Iraq made some progress in chemical (solvent extrac-
tion) and ion-exchange methods of uranium enrichment before the Gulf War.40
The reason for chemical enrichment was to provide feedstock for the EMIS
separators, so they could begin with low enriched uranium instead of natural
uranium, thereby boosting efficiency. Without a well-functioning EMIS pro-
gram, however, this program would have only limited value.
Plutonium Separation
Attempts by Iraqi weapon scientists to produce and separate small quantities
of plutonium at IAEA-safeguarded plants (at Tuwaitha) were rudimentary
and not very successful. The quantities extracted by 1991 (6 gr.) are far
below what is needed for a workable nuclear device. Since then, Iraq may
have been able to separate some 60 gr. a year – again a quantity insufficient
to produce the five to eight kilos needed for a first nuclear device.41
Domestic Uranium Stocks
In January 1991, at the beginning of the war, Iraq possessed somewhat more
than 10 kg. of unirradiated uranium enriched to 90% and somewhat more
uranium enriched to perhaps 80%, irradiated in a reactor.42 By 1998, all nu-
clear material of significance to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was veri-
fied and fully accounted for, and all nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material
(plutonium and HEU) was removed from Iraq.43 Today, both natural uranium
39 IAEA, «Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002)»,
January 27, 2003, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html
40 The Iraq Watch, http://www.iraqwatch.org/wmd/index.html
41 Joseph Cirincione, John Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals. Tracking Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2002,
p. 274.
42 Richard L. Garwin and Georges Charpak, Megawatts and Megatons. A Turning Point in the
Nuclear Age?, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2001, p. 351.
43 IAEA, «Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002)»,
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and low-enriched uranium exist in the country. These materials are under
IAEA safeguards and are thus controlled by the international community. In
accordance with its safeguards obligations, Iraq has allowed the IAEA to
inspect these stocks annually.44
Several states, among them Brazil, have exported uranium to Iraq in the
past. UK allegations that the Iraqis have purchased significant quantities of
uranium from Africa,45 have, however, been repudiated by independent ana-
lysts.46 Still, according to the USA, the hiding of uranium procurement from
Niger is one of several «illustrative examples of omissions from the Iraqi
declaration to the United Nations Security Council».47 Without more spe-
cific information, it has not been possible for the IAEA to draw any conclu-
sions with respect to this issue.48
An attempt made by Iraq to divert HEU from its safeguarded research
reactor fuel (see below) was probably a clear indication that the uranium en-
richment program was still far from production in January 1991.49 According
to a 2001 US Defense Department report, «Iraq would need five or more years
and key foreign assistance» to rebuild its nuclear facilities to enrich sufficient
amounts for a nuclear weapon. This time estimate has remained more less
constant, compared with similar US assessments performed during the mid-
1990s. This conclusion is, moreover, supported by the September 2002 assess-
ment of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, as long as
Iraq is not able to acquire externally supplied fissile material (see below).50
Answer: Could the nuclear capacities of Iraq possibly have been
reinstalled?
Prior to the 1990–91 Gulf War, the Iraqi nuclear weaponization program was
comprehensive in nature, though not very successful and still in its early stages.
Since 1998, Iraq has had a better chance of reconstituting parts of its nuclear
January 27, 2003, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html
44 An inspection of a location just outside the Tuwaitha complex was undertaken in December
2002. The inspection confirmed that the IAEA seals, and the inventory of nuclear material,
remained intact since the last safeguards inspection in January 2002. From IAEA, «Update
Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002)», January 27, 2003,
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html
45 «Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction», The Assessment of the British Government, Stationery
Office, September 24, 2002, http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/iraq/wmd.pdf
46 Francois Misser, «Uranium Fantasies», New African, November 2002, p. 21.
47 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet, «Illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi
Declaration to the United Nations Security Council», Washington, DC, December 19, 2002,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118pf.htm
48 IAEA, «Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002)»,
January 27, 2003, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html
4 9 The Federation of American Scientists, «Iraqi Nuclear Weapons», http://www.fas.org/nuke/
guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm
50 The International Institute of Strategic Studies, «Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. A Net
Assessment», IISS Strategic Dossier, September 9, 2002.
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weapon program, as no international inspectors have been present. Parts of
possible nuclear weaponization attempts, in particular theoretical and pre-
paratory (non-nuclear) elements, could thus have been performed clandes-
tinely.
However, while Iraq’s nuclear weapon ambitions have been, and probably
are, extensive, it is unlikely that the country has managed to reinstall any sig-
nificant parts of its nuclear weapons program. Given the production difficul-
ties the Iraqis were facing and the massive setbacks represented by the Gulf
War and the IAEA inspections, it is unlikely that Iraq possesses any real nu-
clear weapon capability today. Access to highly enriched uranium or plutoni-
um has long been the most formidable barrier to acquiring nuclear weapon
capabilities. Construction and use of new production facilities for fissile ma-
terial would probably have been detected, and most experts do not believe
that Iraq could have completed a facility for producing nuclear weapons-usa-
ble material in only a few years.51
Question: Is there potential for an Iraqi nuclear crash-program?
During the course of the inspections in the 1990s, the IAEA concluded that
the original plan of the Iraqi nuclear weapon program, as set out in 1988, was
to produce a small arsenal of weapons, with the first ones being ready in
1991.52 However, this deadline could not have been met, as production of
highly enriched uranium had lagged far behind. Following the invasion of Kuwait
in August 1990, the lack of fissile material led Iraq to modify the objective of
the original plan and to undertake an accelerated program. Weapons-grade
material was then extracted from safeguarded research reactor fuel, the de-
sign and fabrication of the implosion device were accelerated, a construction
site was selected, and a delivery vehicle was developed.53 According to IAEA
sources, Iraq was then only a few months away from a bomb.54
Now, according to US intelligence, Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear
weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials.55 However,
as noted, the major obstacle to Iraqi nuclear capabilities remains access to
fissile material. Since the 1991 crash-program attempts, the highly enriched
uranium has been removed from the country.56 Iraq is thus probably further
51 Ibid., p. 26.
52 Joseph Cirincione, John Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals. Tracking Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2002,
p. 275.
53 Ibid., loc.cit.
54 Quoted by Norman Dombey, «What Has He Got?», The London Review of Books, October
17, 2002, p. 29.
55 Iraq’s attempt to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes is often quoted as an
indication. See e.g. U.S. State Department, A Decade of Deception and Defiance, September
12, 2002, p. 9,  http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd10.pdf
56 Norman Dombey, «What Has He Got?», The London Review of Books, October 17, 2002, p. 29.
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away than ever from making a nuclear weapon from indigenously produced
material.57
However, if the country is able to acquire externally supplied fissile mate-
rial, this could significantly reduce the time needed to produce and deploy
nuclear weapons. US President Bush claims that «if the Iraqi regime is able
to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger
than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.»58 If
so, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) has estimated this time
range to perhaps «a matter of months».59
But even such short-cuts do not circumvent the need for weaponization of
the material and the construction of reliable delivery systems. These steps
represent particular challenges in themselves, not at least if the size and weight
of the designed weapon indicated above is correct. Based on externally sup-
plied material, the number of weapons possible to produce may, moreover, be
limited. According to IAEA assessments, Iraq is probably looking for a mini-
mum nuclear force of more than a set of single nuclear weapons – both for
deterrence and for possible uses.
A final nuclear crash-program scenario might conceivably involve the com-
missioning of an intact nuclear device. Illicit transfers of nuclear warheads
from former Soviet republics have been reported in the past. None of these
news reports, however, ever seems to have been properly substantiated.
Moreover, acquisition of a complete warhead may still not circumvent the
mentioned challenges with regard to delivery and control of the nuclear de-
vice. Locks and codes against unauthorized use of such warheads could also
limit usability.
Answer: Is there potential for an Iraqi nuclear crash-program?
Past evidence clearly indicates Iraqi interest in nuclear weapon crash-pro-
grams. However, it is unclear how such rapid and swift programs could (sud-
denly) manage to solve many of the significant and long-term problems Iraq
has faced in its earlier nuclear weaponization attempts. The components pre-
viously attempted to be rushed into place were all essential elements of a
nuclear program. These attempts, which not only were abrogated by the Gulf
War, probably also reveal the limitations in any ongoing work. If these pieces
could not be put together before, the prospects of a successful crash-program
(and a particularly stressful one) would seem low.
57 The International Institute of Strategic Studies, «Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. A Net
Assessment», IISS Strategic Dossier, September 9, 2002, p. 26.
5 8 President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, «Remarks by the President on Iraq», Cincinnati Mu-
seum Center – Cincinnati Union Terminal, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002.
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/print/20021007-8.html
59 Ibid., loc.cit.
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Clearly, the most formidable barrier – access to highly enriched ura-
nium or plutonium – could be avoided with material supplied from abroad.
Estimates then indicate an active deployment period of «months» before
Iraq is in possession of nuclear capabilities. President Bush has force-
fully embraced this finding. These disturbing estimates, however, may be
too «optimistic». Even with the nuclear material in hand, the Iraqis would
have to deal with nuclear weapons optimalization and delivery challeng-
es. Moreover, as far as is known, neither Iraq nor any other country has
been able to obtain an intact nuclear device or sufficient fissile material
from any «black markets» for a nuclear device.60
Question: Has Iraq been able to hide parts of its nuclear weapon
program?
A major question today is whether Iraq managed to hide away significant
parts of its weapon programs during the Gulf War and the subsequent inspec-
tions. The preliminary findings of the UN inspectors challenge such assump-
tions. After the previous round of inspections, there were no indications that
there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts
of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.61
During this latest round of inspections, the Iraqi authorities have provided
access to all facilities visited – including presidential compounds and private
residences.62
However, given the magnitude of Iraq’s prewar nuclear program, the size
of the country, the presence of civilian nuclear programs and domestic nucle-
ar know-how, and the radical control exercised by Saddam Hussein, the pros-
pect of clandestine nuclear weapons activity can certainly not be ruled out.
Baghdad has tried to remove nuclear-related equipment like uranium enrich-
ment equipment from clandestine sites before UN inspectors were able to tag
and destroy it.63 As mentioned, documents of relevance to uranium enrich-
ment have been found at private homes, suggesting deliberate evasions.64
60 The International Institute of Strategic Studies, «Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. A Net
Assessment», IISS Strategic Dossier, September 9, 2002, p. 26.
61 IAEA, «Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002)»,
January 27, 2003, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html
62 This access was granted  without conditions and without delay, despite some complaints about
the inconvenience or intrusive nature of the inspection activities. IAEA, «Update Report
for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002)», January 27, 2003, http://
www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html
63 Tim Trevan, «UNSOCM Faces Entirely New Verification Challenges», Arms Control Today,
April 1993.
64 Iraq has therefore been urged to implement measures to locate any other documents which
may have been retained by individuals and which contain information relevant to Iraq’s
nuclear and nuclear-related activities and to provide promptly to the IAEA any documents so
located documents so located. IAEA, «Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to
Resolution 1441 (2002)», January 27, 2003, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/
IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html
Nuclear Dimensions of the Iraqi Crisis
NUPI   MARCH  03
17
Moreover, during earlier inspections, there were reports of trucks full of equip-
ment driving away from the back-gates of plants and facilities as the inspec-
tors entered at the front. There have also been reports of mobile systems, of
trucks full of advanced laboratory equipment, constantly moving around in the
country.65
However, by the time the inspectors were withdrawn in 1998, the IAEA
had been able to draw a comprehensive and coherent picture of Iraq’s past
nuclear weapons program (and to dismantle this program).66 It should thus be
assumed that the IAEA should have a fairly comprehensive picture of where
Iraq’s nuclear facilities could be located today – particularly if provided with
(US) intelligence data. In the first eight weeks of inspections, the IAEA has
visited all sites identified by it or by member states as significant. No evidence
of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities at those locations
has been detected. Nor have the inspections thus far revealed signs of new
nuclear facilities or direct support to any nuclear activity.67 For example, in a
speech October 7, 2003, President Bush claimed that satellite photos of con-
struction activity at Iraqi nuclear facilities indicated that Iraq was developing
nuclear weapons. IAEA inspectors later visited these sites but detected no
evidence of prohibited nuclear weapon activity.68
As opposed to biological or chemical weaponization attempts, a nuclear
weapon program is relatively hard to conceal. Both enrichment and reproc-
essing plants are large industrial complexes that could be detected using sat-
ellite and possibly thermal imagery. Cascades of centrifuges could of course
be concealed in multi-story buildings, but Iraq is highly dependent on imports
to create such a facility and would probably need outside technical support.69
Underground facilities could be spotted by extensive activities on the surface
(e.g. people, shipments) and by tracking electricity consumption and transfers
to specific regions.
Recent developments in North Korea may be indicative. In October 2002,
after being confronted with intelligence evidence from US officials, the coun-
try conceded that it had been pursuing the development of nuclear weapons.
A clandestine program to produce HEU had been installed, despite promises
to the contrary. In 1994, the USA and North Korea found themselves on the
verge of war, after a hidden reprocessing facility was discovered. Moreover,
65 Anthony H. Cordesman, «Iraqi War Fighting Capabilities: A Dynamic Net Assessment»,
Testimony to the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, July 31, 2002, p. 11, http://
www.csis.org/hill/ts020731cord.pdf
66 IAEA, «Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution 1441 (2002)»,
January 27, 2003, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html
67 Ibid.
68 David Cortright, Alistair Millar, George A. Lopez, and Linda Gerber, «UN Weapon Inspections
in Iraq: A Progress Report, published by the Forth Freedom Forum and Joan B. Koch Institute
for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, January 23, 2003, p. 10,
www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/inspections_report.pdf
69 Ibid., p. 10.
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the transfer of sensitive reprocessing chemicals from China to North Korea
was recently exposed. Thus, heavily monitored countries pursuing clandes-
tine production and illicit nuclear transfers would seem to face distinct risks
of being detected.
The monitoring and detection abilities of the IAEA have improved steadily
over the past decade. Inspectors are now able to use an array of devices
including hand-held sensors and high-speed communications technologies,
enabling them to analyze data and receive encrypted intelligence in a fraction
of the time required only five years ago.70 In addition to visual inspections,
UN inspectors are thus gathering air, water, soil and dust samples to test Sadd-
am Hussein’s claims that his country poses no nuclear threat. Environmental
sampling could detect both ongoing and earlier nuclear activities: The inspec-
tors are able to detect minuscule quantities of different radioactive isotopes,
from which any earlier nuclear enrichment or reprocessing activities at the
facilities can be determined.71
Finally, Resolution 1441 opens the way for questioning key scientists in the
weapons program. To ensure their security and cooperation, such persons can,
together with their families, be taken outside the country. To meet internation-
al criticism, on January 20, 2003, Iraq struck a deal with the UN, allowing its
scientists and officials to be questioned without the presence of government
minders.72 Under another clause of the deal, the Iraqis agreed to send out their
own teams to look for armaments that may have been omitted from the in-
ventory submitted to the UN in December 2002.
Answer: Has Iraq been able to hide parts of its nuclear weapon
program?
International inspectors and the intelligence community are likely to possess a
fairly comprehensive picture of Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure. Clandestine and
hidden nuclear weapon production in Iraq cannot, of course, be ruled out.
However, attempts at earlier weaponization efforts –in Iraq and elsewhere –
have been identified. Moreover, new and intrusive equipment for detection
for verification and control could challenge any clandestine Iraqi nuclear activities.
While any remaining (and isolated) parts of the Iraqi program that may have
avoided public scrutiny could provide a useful stepping-stone for future nu-
clear weaponization, its current usability, e.g. for comprehensive nuclear crash-
programs, would seem limited. Finally, the country might have been able to
hide away small quantities of fissile material. However, these limited quanti-
70 Ibid., p. 9.
71 CNN, «U.N. Lab to Determine Iraq Nuke Status», December 11, 2002 http://www.cnn.com/
2002/TECH/science/12/11/science.saddam.ap/index.html
72 Julian Borger and Helena Smith, «Iraq and UN Reach Deal on Cooperation», The Guardian,
January 21, 2003, p. 4.
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ties, if available, may not suffice for a nuclear weapon, and Iraq would still
face the challenges of weaponizing the fissile material.
Question: Does Iraq possess Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs)?
Like any other state, Iraq would find it easier to acquire radioactive materials
for a radiological weapon – or a so-called dirty radioactive bomb – than to
assemble a workable nuclear device. Radioactive sources are widely distrib-
uted with no international control, and are thus probably fairly accessible. It
may be that Iraq has access to radioactive material in sufficient quantities to
inflict damage and substantial disruption.
In the past, Iraq has indeed attempted to build RDDs. Iraqi defectors claim
to have had taken part in both radioactive material procurement and the de-
velopment of devices, but such information has not been officially confirmed.73
In 1995, the IAEA and UNSCOM discovered earlier Iraqi efforts aimed at
developing a device to scatter lethal radioactive debris. These weapons used
irradiated zirconium oxide and were designed to produce an «area denial»
weapon for the Iran–Iraq War.74 Three prototypes, one ground-level device
and two bomb-types, were developed. According to the Iraqis, however, the
program did not meet expectations and was later abandoned. Reportedly, the
design was inefficient, as well as being far too large to be delivered by mis-
siles available in the Iraqi inventory.75
Radioactive material could also be used to create disruption and economic
losses without the use of specially designed RDDs. A scenario involving radi-
oactive materials could be the sabotaging of Iraqi oil fields. To sky-rocket oil
prices, oil wells could again be set on fire and possibly simultaneously con-
taminated with chemical or radiological material.76
Answer: Does Iraq possess Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs)?
Iraq is likely to be capable of building a crude radiological weapon. The pres-
ence and possible use of such weapons is thus a question not of availability,
but of usability. As military devices RRDs have obvious limitations, with a
restricted ability inflict acute damages or casualties. Radioactive material may,
however, play a role during acts of sabotage, possibly of oil wells, or in deny-
ing troops access to/ through limited areas. However, to be effective this
requires a certain level of pre-planning on the Iraqi side.
73 The International Institute of Strategic Studies, «Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. A Net
Assessment», IISS Strategic Dossier, September 9, 2002, p. 26.
74 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1999, p. 647.
75 The International Institute of Strategic Studies, «Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. A Net
Assessment», IISS Strategic Dossier, September 9, 2002, p. 26.
76 Paul Rogers raises this possibility in his report Iraq: Consequences of a War, Briefing Paper,
Oxford Research Group, October 2002, p. 10.
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Could allied coalition forces possibly use nuclear weapons?
The possible use of nuclear weapons by any allied coalition forces may seem
particularly remote, given the conventional weapon superiority of such forces,
coupled with the long-standing threshold against using nuclear weapons, and
the fact that the primary role of nuclear weapons has long been to deter
others from using such weapons. However, both technical developments in
nuclear weapons and recent statements by key allied officials make it neces-
sary to consider this option and associated scenarios.
Question: Could the USA resort to the nuclear option?
On December 11, 2002, the Bush Administration issued a reminder and clari-
fication of its policy that warns any nation contemplating the use of weapons
of mass destruction against the United States or its allies that it will face
massive retaliation, possibly including nuclear weapons.77 In the US dossier,
the conventional and nuclear response and defense capabilities of the USA
were stressed as an important part of the posture against weapons of mass
destruction threats – also in the context of «pre-emptive» strikes.78 The same
document underlined, however, that «a strong declaratory policy» is an essen-
tial element of the contemporary US deterrent posture, along with the full
range of political tools to persuade potential adversaries not to seek or use
WMD. The threats may thus primarily be of a political nature, meant to deter
any stockpiling or use of chemical or biological weapons – thus the strong
language. For example, according to Andrew H. Card Jr., the White House
Chief of Staff, the United States is prepared to use nuclear weapons if need
be against Iraq: «Should Saddam Hussein have any thought that he would use
a weapon of mass destruction, he should anticipate that the United States will
use whatever means necessary to protect us and the world from a holo-
caust.»79
However, intelligence data indeed show that Saddam Hussein attaches great
importance to possessing the weapons of mass destruction which he regards
77 U.S. «National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction», December 2002, http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf  . See also CNN, «U.S. Warns
Potential Enemies: Retaliation Could Include Nukes», December 11, 2002, http://
www.cnn.com/2002/US/12/11/bush.weapons.security/index.html
78 The strategy document is an unclassified extract of Top Secret National Security Presidential
Directive 17. The unclassified version asserts that «We will not permit the world’s most
dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.»
It also notes that «because deterrence may not succeed ... U.S. military forces and appropriate
civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including
in appropriate cases through pre-emptive measures.» From the National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book No. 80, edited by Jeffrey Richelson, December 20, 2002, http://
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80
79 Mark Landler and Alan Cowell, «Powell, in Europe, Nearly Dismisses U.N.’s Iraq report»,
New York Times, January 23, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/international/
middleeast/27IRAQ.html?todaysheadlines
Nuclear Dimensions of the Iraqi Crisis
NUPI   MARCH  03
21
as the basis for Iraq’s regional power – and, according to allied assessments,
he is ready to use them.80 Declassified information has shown, for instance,
that in the fall of 1990, the Iraqi president ordered that plans be drawn up for
the airborne delivery of an unspecified biological agent. The probable target
was Israel.81
Even before the USA abandoned its «calculated ambiguity» doctrine, in
which the US government in the past was deliberately unclear about its re-
sponses, 82 strong calls were made about the dangers of using nuclear threats
to deter biological and chemical weapons attacks. This could easily create a
«commitment trap» in which US leaders would «feel compelled to use nucle-
ar weapons after a biological or chemical attack because they believed that
adversaries and allies perceive that the US reputation for honoring its com-
mitments was at stake».83 Thus, in an extreme case, Iraqi use of chemical or
biological weapons could result in nuclear retaliation by the USA.
The results of a war game conducted in July 1995 may be illustrative. The
Global 95 exercise was based on two simultaneous crises, one in Korea and
the other in the Persian Gulf, strikingly similar to today’s conflict pattern.84
The Korea crisis was terminated, but the other escalated to the point where
Iraq used biological weapons, with devastating effect against military forces
and civilians in the region. In this simulation, the United States retaliated with
nuclear weapons to end the war. The escalation was unexpected and, within
the rules of the exercise, apparently not subject to control.85
The voice of the people may push the USA further in the direction of
resorting to nuclear weapons. Today most Americans favor using nuclear
weapons against Iraq, should Saddam Hussein attack US military forces with
chemical or biological weapons. A December 2002 survey found that 6 in 10
Americans favored a nuclear response if Hussein ordered the use of chemi-
cal or biological weapons on US troops.86 Moreover, active use of nuclear
80 «Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction», The Assessment of the British Government, Stationary
Office, September 24, 2002, p. 18, http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/iraq/wmd.pdf
81 The first mission was, however, shot down over the Persian Gulf and according to CIA «no
efforts were made to find another method to deliver the BW agent». The plan envisioned a
conventional air raid employing three MiG-21s, to be followed by another raid involving
three MiGs and a SU-22 aircraft that would disperse the biological agent. From CIA, Iraqi BW
Mission Planning, 1992, a secret document declassified through the Freedom of Information
Act and published by the National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 80, edited
by Jeffrey Richelson, December 20, 2002, Document 5, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd05.pdf
82 This doctrine basically left open the US response to biological or chemical attacks, to make
any potential adversary unsure of the response.
83 Scott Sagan, «The Commitment Trap», International Security, vol. 24, no.4, Spring 2000, p. 113.
84 The exercise is described by Theresa Hitchens, «Wargame Finds U.S. Short in Biowar»,
Defense News, August 28, 1995, and discussed in Paul Rogers,  Iraq: Consequences of a War,
Briefing Paper, Oxford Research Group, October 2002, pp. 11-12
85 Paul Rogers, Iraq: Consequences of a War, Briefing Paper, Oxford Research Group, October
2002, p. 12.
86 Richard Morin, «Most Favor Nuclear Option Against Iraq», Washington Post, December 18,
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weapons was advocated for retaliation after the attacks of September 11,
2001.87
Disturbingly, the US nuclear option may not purely be for declaratory or
retaliatory purposes. According to the US Nuclear Posture Review, released
in December 2001, «new capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging
threats such as hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), to find and attack
mobile and relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents, and to
improve accuracy and limit collateral damage».88 The range of new capabil-
ities mentioned here includes nuclear weapons, and the attacks could be per-
formed against any state. Options of a nuclear first-strike war may thus be
more than a relic of the Cold War years.89 To the Bush Administration a low-
yield nuclear weapon would, moreover, have greater deterrence value, be-
cause of its possible usability. Voices close to the White House have argued
that having only high-yield weapons could in fact self-deter the United States,
as such weapons are too large to be used in practice.90
Thus the USA is developing small, precision-guided and nuclear-tipped
missiles to destroy deep underground targets such as command bunkers, and
storages with chemical and biological weapons. Reportedly, potential adver-
saries of the USA have responded to its global striking capabilities by burying
key command and control installations and storages deeper and deeper un-
derground and inside mountains.91 The US Defense Department is certain that
Iraq is hiding chemical and biological weapons underneath its vast deserts.92
No open-source information, however, seems available to support this. Ac-
cording to intelligence estimates, there are more than 10,000 such «havens»
in dozens of countries around the world.93 About one thousand of these caves,
tunnels and labyrinths are considered to be of high strategic value because
they are suspected of harboring chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, long-
range missiles, or control centers.
2002; Page A18, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4014-2002Dec17.html
87 To retaliate after September 11, 2000, and to raise the bar against future such acts from
occurring, a call was made after the attacks to use «at a bare minimum, tactical nuclear
capabilities» against bin Laden camps in the deserts of Afghanistan. See Thomas Woodrow,
«Time to Use the Nuclear Option», The Washington Times, op-ed, September 14, 2001, p.
A23. The author was a 22-year veteran intelligence officer, recently resigned from the US
Defense Intelligence Agency. At that point, however, the views of author clearly did not
represent mainstream US thinking.
88 From the Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], Submitted to Congress on December 31,
2001,http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm
89 Steven Miller, «The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy of No-First-Use», Paper
presented at the Pugwash Meeting No. 279, «No First Use of Nuclear Weapons», London,
November 15–17, 2002, www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/miller.htm
90 Steven Younger, Head of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to Andrew Koch, «The
Bunker Nightmare Goes Nuclear», Popular Science, December 12, 2002, http://
www.popsci.com/popsci/science/article/0,12543,351094,00.html
91 «Tiny Nukes», Cover story in Popular Mechanics, October 2002, p. 67.
92 Andrew Koch, «The Bunker Nightmare Goes Nuclear», Popular Science, December 12,
2002, http://www.popsci.com/popsci/science/article/0,12543,351094,00.html
93 Ibid.
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Ideally, after burrowing into the buried bunker or weapon storage, the low-
yield nuclear device would detonate and melt the surrounding rock into a sealed
compartment. In theory, no radioactive releases would thus escape, and the
target would be thoroughly destroyed. In practice, however, things probably
look different. Robert Nelson, a physicist at Princeton University, has calcu-
lated the effects of the so-called «Robust Earth-Penetrator». While it is true
that most material would remain within the blast area, a plume of radioactive
gases would result. Even if an earth-penetrating missile were somehow able
to drill hundreds of feet into the ground and then detonate, the explosion would
be likely to shower the surrounding region with highly radioactive dust and
gas.94 To fully contain the explosion of a 0.1 kiloton weapon (about one-hun-
dredth of the energy of the weapon dropped on Hiroshima), the device would
have to penetrate to approximately 70 m.95 But for the current bunker-busters,
reaching a depth of only 50 feet (slightly more than 15 m.) is still a challenge.96
The radioactive fall-out and collateral damage would thus probably be sig-
nificant. For a 1 kiloton (approximately one-tenth of the yield of the Hiroshima
weapon) earth-penetrator detonated in a dense urban area, deaths could
number in the tens of thousands.97 Detonations outside a city area would less-
en the collateral damage. While the explosion itself could destroy facilities
buried under nearly 30 m. of granite, such a bunker-busting fission bomb det-
onated 5 m. underground in a wind of 16 km/hour could result in lethal radia-
tion doses to residents as far as 3 km downwind. 98
Answer: Could the USA resort to the nuclear option?
Iraq has had strong incentives to improve the efficiency of its chemical and
biological weapons over the last decade.99 From what is known from earlier
Iraqi chemical and biological warfare, scenarios involving such weapons dur-
ing a military intervention cannot be ruled out. In accordance with current US
94 Robert W. Nelson Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons, Public Interest Report,
The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, Volume 54, Number 1, January/February
2001, http://www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n1/weapons.htm .
95 «Tiny Nukes», Cover story, Popular Mechanics, October 2002, p. 67.
9 6 Sidney Drell,  Stanford physicist and  long-term advisor to the US government on nuclear
weapon issues, quoted by Andrew Koch, «The Bunker Nightmare Goes Nuclear», Popular
Science, December 12, 2002, http://www.popsci.com/popsci/science/article/
0,12543,351094,00.html
97 Michael Levi, Fire in the Hole. Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Options for Counterproliferation,
Working Paper no. 31, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2002.
98 Ibid.
99 According to Anthony H. Cordesman «there is a broad agreement among exerts that Iraq has
probably developed effective sprayer and line source-delivery technology since the Gulf war.
This is the most lethal way to deliver chemical and biological weapons, and is far more
effective than using even advanced missile warheads», from Anthony H. Cordesman, «Iraqi
War Fighting Capabilities: A Dynamic Net Assessment», Testimony to the Senate Committee
of Foreign Relations, July 31, 2002, p. 9, http://www.csis.org/hill/ts020731cord.pdf
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military doctrines, Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons could – in an
extreme case – result in nuclear retaliation by the USA. In the absence of
own biological and chemical weapon capabilities, the USA has now resorted
to the «big stick» of nuclear weapons to deter the use of biological and chemi-
cal weapons. The way from words to action is a long one, but it is an open
question how long nuclear threats against biological and chemical attacks
could sustain credibility. Deterrence rests upon credible threats. The dilemma
of the «commitment trap»– leading up to «compulsory» nuclear use by US
forces in response to chemical and biological attacks – could thus eventually
push the USA in the nuclear direction.
US nuclear weapons could also be used to take out hardened and buried
installations, including possible commando bunkers or storage facilities for
biological chemical weapons. The notion of limited and confined nuclear war-
fare associated with the small, precision-guided nuclear warheads could serve
to lower the nuclear threshold. The use of nuclear weapons against under-
ground facilities would, however, probably result in substantial radioactive fall-
out. This would not only cause severe collateral damage, but could also impede
own military forces.
Question: Could other members of allied coalition forces resort to the
nuclear option?
The number of participating states in a possible Iraqi military intervention will
probably depend on the outcome of the ongoing inspections and the appurte-
nant process in the UN Security Council. Amongst the most prominent candi-
dates to join in with the USA is the United Kingdom, itself a nuclear weapon
state.
Initially, the British contribution will, like that of the USA, involve solely
conventional armed force. However, as with the USA, there could be circum-
stances when Britain would consider using nuclear weapons to respond to or
even deter attacks involving chemical or biological weapons.100 In March 2002,
UK Secretary of State for Defence, Geoffrey Hoon, said: «they can be abso-
lutely confident that in the right conditions we would be willing to use our nuclear
weapons». «They» specifically referred to the Iraqis, and the statement was
confirmed and repeated in a later television interview.101
100 Paul Rogers, Iraq: Consequences of a War, Briefing Paper, Oxford Research Group, October
2002, p. 14.
101 Quoted in Paul Rogers, loc.cit..
Nuclear Dimensions of the Iraqi Crisis
NUPI   MARCH  03
25
Answer: Could other members of allied coalition forces resort to the
nuclear option?
Like the USA, Britain could find itself in a situation where nuclear weapons
could have to be contemplated, e.g. after or during a biological attack by Iraq.
Statements by key UK officials confirm such a possibility. The UK has not,
however, taken the same steps as the United States to remilitarize its nuclear
weapons in the form of small tactical nuclear-tipped bunker-busters.
Could other actors involved resort to nuclear weapons?
Finally, the possibility of nuclear inducement by other actors in the region
should be discussed. A prime candidate could be Israel, a country with
longstanding – albeit undeclared – nuclear capabilities, and possibly terrorists
pursuing nuclear weapons.
Question: Could Israel, if attacked, resort to nuclear weapons?
Iraq has openly threatened to escalate the war if attacked by the USA.102
During the first Gulf War, 39 conventionally armed SCUD missiles were
launched by the Iraqis at Israel, probably intended to erode Arab and Islamic
coalition support, incite Arab publics, and possibly transform the conflict into
one pitting Israel and the United States against some coalition of Arab
regimes.103 None of these missiles contained biological or chemical material.
Iraq did not succeed in escalating the war by attacking Israel in 1991, but
there is no guarantee that it will not try again, possibly – depending on current
delivery capabilities – with biological or chemical weapons. The current number
of operational Iraqi SCUDs could be anywhere between 20 and 80.104
More elaborate scenarios could involve violent acts by terrorists within
Israel, where Iraq might provide suicide-bombers with biological material.105
Nor can one rule out biological or chemical terrorist acts of other terrorist groups
without any formal or practical linkages with Iraq – groups simply seeking to
add significant fuel to the fire.
102 Steven E. Miller, «Force, Order, and the Implications of War with Iraq», Working paper
presented at Pugwash Meeting No. 276, Pugwash Workshop on Terrorism: Terrorism with
WMD, Como Italy, 26–28 September 2002, p. 10.
103 Ibid.
104 Anthony H. Cordesman, «Iraqi War Fighting Capabilities: A Dynamic Net Assessment»,
Testimony to the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, July 31, 2002, p. 8, http://
www.csis.org/hill/ts020731cord.pdf
105 As contemplated by Steven E. Miller, «Force, Order, and the Implications of War with
Iraq», Working paper presented at Pugwash Meeting No. 276, Pugwash Workshop on
Terrorism: Terrorism with WMD, Como, Italy, 26–28 September 2002, p. 10.
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Answer: Could Israel, if attacked, resort to nuclear weapons?
Israel is vulnerable to chemical and biological attacks, delivered by both con-
ventional (military) and non-conventional (terrorist) means. Any successful
large-scale attack in or on Israel with ties to Iraq during a military crisis would
have severe ramifications.
However, it remains an open issue whether Iraq again will attack Israel,
and, moreover, if it will do so with biological or chemical weapons. Even in
the event of a biological or chemical attack, Israel might respond solely with
conventional weaponry. Israel has never officially confirmed its nuclear weap-
on program, and the country enjoys its current nuclear ambiguity. Revealing
its nuclear capabilities would likely cause uproar amongst Arab neighbors, and
could thus back-fire on Israel itself.
Question: Is there a nuclear linkage to terrorists?
The greatest fear of President Bush is «that terrorists will find a shortcut to
their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technolo-
gies to kill on a massive scale.»106 According to John Bolton, US Under
Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, «terrorist groups
now seek to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons any way they
can. In parallel, state sponsors of terrorism are actively working to acquire
weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems.»107
Iraq has denied any connection to terrorism. But the Bush Administration
has persistently tried to link Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, and to reveal a
«weapons of mass destruction conspiracy». Speaking at the World Economic
Forum on January 26, 2003, US Secretary of State Powell’s repeated his as-
sertion that Saddam Hussein has «clear ties» to Al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups. The longer he goes without being disarmed of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, Powell said, the more likely he is «to pass a weapon, share
a technology or use these weapons again».108 News of a «credible report that
Islamic extremists affiliated with al Qaeda took possession of a chemical
weapon in Iraq last month or late in October» surfaced in mid-December
2002.109 However, as is often the case with intelligence data, the reported
chemical weapon transfer is not backed by open-source evidence.
106 George W. Bush as quoted by John R. Bolton, US Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, «The International Aspects of Terrorism and Weapons of Mass
Destruction», Remarks to the Second Global Conference on Nuclear, Bio/Chem Terrorism:
Mitigation and Response, The Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., November 1, 2002
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/14848pf.htm
107 John R. Bolton, op.cit.
108 CNN, « U.S. drafting use-of-force resolution», January 27, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/
2003/US/01/27/sprj.irq.wrap/index.html
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Answer: Is there a nuclear linkage to terrorists?
While Saddam Hussein has a record of sponsoring terrorists, no hard facts
have so far been provided to support alleged linkages between him and groups
pursuing biological, chemical or nuclear weapon capabilities. This may be due
to lack of evidence – or because biological and chemical weapons may ex-
tend beyond what states are willing to provide to support sub-national groups.
Traditionally, state sponsoring of terrorists has involved safe havens and im-
munity, conventional weapons training, equipment, and logistics, and financial
support.
Iraq’s lack of nuclear weapon capabilities renders, of course, any assist-
ance in this field particularly difficult, so the nuclear terrorist threat would seem
limited.
Conclusions
The overall risk of a nuclear outcome to the Iraqi crisis may be limited, but it
is not negligible.
Iraq’s nuclear ambitions have been ambitious – nearly all technical options
available have been pursued in the country’s efforts to acquire fissile materi-
al. And yet, Iraq now seems farther than ever from nuclear weapon capabil-
ities. Of possible weapons – biological, chemical or nuclear – the latter seem
the furthest from the Iraqi grasp. Iraq’s pre-Gulf War nuclear infrastructure
and material assets were effectively disarmed by 1998, when the UN inspec-
tors had to leave the country. Subsequent sanctions and close international
monitoring have rendered any substantial rebuilding of the program difficult.
It thus appears unlikely that Iraqi today has an operational nuclear weapon
infrastructure, or a clandestine nuclear weapon capability. To date, the IAEA
has found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear program since the elim-
ination of the program in the 1990s.110
For any other state actors who might become involved in the conflict, sev-
eral constraining factors mitigate against the use of nuclear weapons. First of
all, the vast majority of states still perceive nuclear weapons as weapons of
last resort, and as a tool to deter others from using such weapons, through the
prospects of massive retaliation. Strong «nuclear taboos» prevail, and any state
resorting to first-use of such weapons would be likely to face heavy stigmati-
zation and enormous political costs. For Israel, special considerations may be
particularly important, as the country most probably would be reluctant to for-
swear its long-standing nuclear-weapon ambiguity. Secondly, from what is
known about past (and limited) effects of biological and chemical attacks, the
109 Barton Gellman, « U.S. Suspects Al Qaeda Got Nerve Agent From Iraqis», Washington Post,
December 12,
110 Statement given by IAEA Director ElBaradei to the UN Security Council, January 27,
2003.
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use of such weaponry may not be sufficient to justify the extensive damage
that nuclear weapons could inflict. Finally, given the conventional superiority
of the coalition forces, nuclear weapons may simply not be needed in a mili-
tary conflict.
However, one cannot completely discount scenarios involving the active
use of nuclear weapons, escalating from conventional war in the event of bi-
ological or chemical attacks. Both the USA and the UK have officially an-
nounced that they could respond with nuclear force in such a case. Clearly,
the way from words to action is a long one, but, in order to maintain trustwor-
thiness, these declaratory commitments might eventually have to be fulfilled.
Deterrence rests upon credible threats.
Moreover, to maintain a full range of nuclear capabilities – and to maintain
its «deterrence value» – the Bush Administration has developed small, preci-
sion-guided nuclear missiles to destroy hardened targets. As states could pro-
tect and hide vital commando centers and biological and chemical weapons
and material underground, the USA has come to regard new offensive nucle-
ar capacities as a necessary as part of a wide range of response options. Such
remilitarization of nuclear weapons can only blur the boundaries between
conventional and non-conventional weaponry, and might well increase the risk
of nuclear war. Indeed, the notion of limited and confined nuclear warfare
associated with the small, precision-guided nuclear warheads under develop-
ment could serve to weaken the «nuclear taboo».
The Bush Administration’s interest in nuclear contingency plans stems from
its deeply held conviction that the United States must act against Iraq because
of new and more dangerous threats involving biological, chemical or nuclear
weapons.111 Recently declassified CIA information, however, suggests that
an undisturbed Iraq poses a «low» threat to US security interests, and that the
only plausible scenario in which Saddam Hussein would actually deploy chem-
ical or biological weapons would be one where he was attacked, and felt he
had nothing to lose.112
111William M. Arkin, «The Nuclear Option in Iraq», Los Angeles Times, January 26, 2003,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/wire/la-op-arkin26jan26.story
112CIA Letter to Senate on Baghdad’s intentions, October 7, 2002, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd13.pdf . See also, «Iraq Unlikely to Initiate Attack on US: CIA»,
The Dawn, October 9, 2002, http://www.dawn.com/2002/10/10/int1.htm
